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Abstract
Sometimes instrumental variable methods are used to test whether a causal effect is null rather than to estimate the
magnitude of a causal effect. However, when instrumental variable methods are applied to time-varying exposures, as in
many Mendelian randomization studies, it is unclear what causal null hypothesis is tested. Here, we consider different
versions of causal null hypotheses for time-varying exposures, show that the instrumental variable conditions alone are
insufficient to test some of them, and describe additional assumptions that can be made to test a wider range of causal null
hypotheses, including both sharp and average causal null hypotheses. Implications for interpretation and reporting of
instrumental variable results are discussed.
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Instrumental variables are often used in observational
studies, e.g., many Mendelian randomization studies, to
obtain numerical estimates of causal effects. The validity
of the effect estimates requires two conditions: (i) the
proposed instrumental variable is indeed an instrumental
variable, or instrument, as formalized below, and (ii) an
additional condition requiring either some form of effect
homogeneity or a monotonic relation between the instru-
mental variable and the exposure [1]. Condition (ii) is
untenable in many research settings and has been met with
skepticism by some investigators [1–4]. Because condition
(ii) is often questionable, an alternative is to change the
goal of the analysis from obtaining a numerical estimate of
the causal effect to simply determining whether the expo-
sure has any effect on the outcome [5]. For the purposes of
such causal null testing, it has been argued, condition (i) is
sufficient [5, 6].
A difficulty with causal null hypothesis testing is that it
is often unclear what the hypothesis is. For example,
studying the effect of alcohol requires the specification of
the effect in terms of a contrast of hypothetical interven-
tions sustained over time, e.g., ‘‘consume a glass of red
wine every other day throughout adulthood’’ [7, 8]. How-
ever, many studies using instrumental variable methods
leave the strategies of interest unspecified. Because there
are many such strategies, there are multiple possible con-
trasts and therefore multiple causal null hypotheses that can
be tested.
Here, we consider different versions of causal null
hypotheses, describe conditions under which the instru-
ment-outcome association can be used to test these
hypotheses, and discuss how to conduct and interpret
results from these tests. We begin by reviewing established
results in the simple setting of time-fixed treatments [9],
and then extend our discussion to more realistic settings
with time-varying treatments.
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Causal null hypotheses for time-fixed
treatments
The causal diagram in Fig. 1 depicts a causal instrument Z,
a time-fixed treatment A, and an outcome Y. For simplicity,
suppose both the instrument and the treatment are binary,
the outcome is continuous, and faithfulness holds (for
additional settings, see Appendix). An instrument-based
test of the causal null hypothesis of treatment A is a test of
whether the instrument-outcome association is null, that is,
a test of the equality of the quantities E½Y jZ ¼ 1 and
E½Y jZ ¼ 0. We now discuss the validity of this test for
different types of causal null hypotheses.
First, let us first consider the sharp causal null hypoth-
esis: treatment does not affect the outcome for any indi-
vidual in the study population. Formally, Ya¼1i ¼ Ya¼0i for
all individuals i, where Yai is individual i’s counterfactual
or potential outcome under treatment level a. Because there
is no arrow from A to Y, Fig. 1 represents a setting in which
the sharp causal null holds.
In this setting, the quantities E½YjZ ¼ 1 and E½YjZ ¼ 0
are expected to be equal because, in Fig. 1, Z and Y are d-
separated (for a proof based on counterfactual expressions
see the Appendix). By the contrapositive, if our estimates
of E½Y jZ ¼ 1 and E½YjZ ¼ 0 in the study population are
not equal and Z is an instrument, then we have evidence
against the sharp causal null.
Unfortunately, in real-world data analyses, we can never
know for sure that Z is an instrument. If Z were not an
instrument, as depicted in the causal diagrams of Fig. 2,
then Z and Y are not d-separated even though the sharp
causal null holds. Therefore, if our estimates of E½YjZ ¼ 1
and E½Y jZ ¼ 0 in the study population are not equal, then
we have evidence that at least one of the following is true:
the sharp causal null does not hold or the proposed
instrument is not an instrument. Note that under Fig. 2a, b,
it would still be possible to find evidence against the sharp
causal null if E½Y jZ ¼ 1; L ¼ l and E½Y jZ ¼ 0; L ¼ l were
not equal in at least one stratum L = l; no such possibility
exists for Fig. 2c.
Second, let us consider the average causal null hypoth-
esis: treatment does not affect the average outcome in the
study population, or E Ya¼1½  ¼ E Ya¼0½ . The average
causal null hypothesis is of interest when, for example, we
plan to apply an intervention to an entire population.
Because the sharp causal null hypothesis implies the
average causal null hypothesis, the latter holds under the
causal diagram in Fig. 1.
When the average causal null hypothesis holds, E½Y jZ ¼
1 and E½YjZ ¼ 0 are not guaranteed to be equal without
additional conditions. One additional condition that would
guarantee equality is a monotonic treatment effect: for a
binary A, the treatment is either beneficial or harmful for all
individuals in the study population (e.g., Ya¼1i  Ya¼0i for
all individuals i) [9]. By the contrapositive, whenever our
estimates of E½Y jZ ¼ 1 and E½YjZ ¼ 0 are not equal, we
have evidence that at least one of the following is true: the
average causal null does not hold, the proposed instrument
is not an instrument, or the treatment effect is not
monotonic.
Fig. 1 Causal diagram depicting a causal instrument Z, a time-fixed
treatment A, an outcome Y, and unmeasured confounders U
Fig. 2 Causal diagrams depicting some violations of the instrumental
conditions for a proposed instrument Z, a time-fixed treatment A, and
an outcome Y. The scenarios represent a a violation of the
instrumental exchageability condition via confounding, b a violation
of the instrumental exchangeability condition via selection bias, and
c a violation of the instrumental exclusion restriction condition via a
direct path from Z to Y. In (a, b), Z would satisfy the instrumental
conditions conditional on L
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Finally, another causal null hypothesis is the ‘‘complier’’
average causal null hypothesis: E Ya¼1jAz¼0\Az¼1½  ¼
E½Ya¼0jAz¼0\Az¼1 [10]. Because this expression has no
analogue for time-varying treatments, we do not consider it
here.
Importantly, if testing were the only goal, we would not
need the common instrumental variable analysis or related
methods developed to estimate treatment effects. Yet,
many published analyses focus on whether or not their
results demonstrated a non-null causal effect, but use
instrumental variable analyses and report numeric effect
estimates. This is perhaps due to investigators recognizing
the additional assumptions needed for these effect esti-
mates to be valid are biologically implausible, let alone the
additional issues with interpretation of these effect esti-
mates when the treatment strategies are sustained over time
[2, 7, 8, 11]. Therefore, if the investigators are reluctant to
interpret the magnitude of the point estimate as that of an
average causal effect, they can increase the transparency of
their analysis by either making their reluctance explicit or
restricting the presentation of results to the testing of the
null.
Causal null hypotheses for time-varying
treatments
The causal diagram in Fig. 3 depicts a binary instrument Z,
a time-varying treatment measured at two time points (A0,
A1), and an outcome measured at two time points (Y0, Y1).
The causal null hypothesis of interest is now concerning
whether the joint effect of the time-varying treatment (A0,
A1) on the outcome Y1 is null. (Results for the effect of A0
on Y0 follow immediately from the time-fixed treatment
setting discussed above.) An instrument-based test of the
joint causal null hypothesis of treatment (A0, A1) is a test of
the equality of the quantities E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼ 0.
We now discuss the validity of this test for different types
of causal null hypotheses.
First, consider the joint sharp causal null hypothesis:
treatment at any time does not affect the outcome for any
individual in the study population. Formally, Y
a0¼1;a1¼1
1i ¼
Y
a0¼0;a1¼1
1i ¼ Ya0¼1;a1¼01i ¼ Ya0¼0;a1¼01i for all individuals
i. Because there is no arrow from either A0 or A1 to Y1,
Fig. 3 represents a setting in which the joint sharp causal
null hypothesis holds.
When the joint sharp causal null holds and Z is a true
instrument, then the quantities E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼
0 are equal because, in Fig. 3, Z and Y1 are d-separated. By
the contrapositive, if our estimates of E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and
E½Y1jZ ¼ 0 are not equal and Z is an instrument, then we
have evidence against the joint sharp causal null hypothe-
sis. However, knowing that E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼ 0
are not equal does not inform which of the four counter-
factual outcomes are not equal: even if Z were an instru-
ment, we have evidence that at least one of these
counterfactual outcomes is not equal to the others for at
least one individual, but we would not have evidence
against a sharp causal null comparing only (for example)
continuous treatment [Y
a0¼1;a1¼1
1i ] and continuous non-
treatment [Y
a0¼0;a1¼0
1i ].
Second, consider the joint average causal null hypoth-
esis: treatment does not affect the average outcome in the
study population, or E Y
a0¼1;a1¼1
1
h i
¼ E Ya0¼0;a1¼11
h i
¼
E Y
a0¼1;a1¼0
1
h i
¼ E Ya0¼0;a1¼01
h i
: As for a time-fixed treat-
ment, our observed data on E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼ 0
provides no evidence for or against the average causal null
without further assumptions. We can extend the monotonic
treatment effect condition above to time-varying treat-
ments: for example, specifying Y
a0¼1;a1¼1
1i is the minimum
value and Y
a0¼0;a1¼0
1i is the maximum value across all
possible outcomes for each individual i in the study pop-
ulation (see Appendix for more general expressions of a
monotonic treatment effect condition). Under this addi-
tional condition, then we indeed would expect the quanti-
ties to be equal. By the contrapositive, this implies that
whenever our estimates of E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼ 0 are
not equal, we have evidence that at least one of the fol-
lowing is true: the joint average causal null does not hold,
the proposed instrument is not an instrument, or the treat-
ment effect is not monotonic.
Finally, we could also consider causal null hypotheses
regarding the effect of A1 on Y1 without reference to the
earlier treatment time A0: a sharp causal null hypothesis of
Ya1¼11i ¼ Ya1¼01i for all individuals i, and an average causal
null hypothesis of E Ya1¼11
  ¼ E Ya1¼01
 
. For estimating
E½Y1jZ ¼ 1 and E½Y1jZ ¼ 0 to provide evidence for or
against either of these conditions, however, there cannot be
a path from Z to A0 to Y1 (either directly or through Y0). In
Fig. 3 Causal diagram depicting a causal instrument Z, a treatment
A measured at two time points (A0, A1), an outcome Y measured at
two time points (Y0, Y1), and unmeasured confounders U
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other words, Z needs to satisfy the instrumental condi-
tions (i) for A1 by itself, not necessarily jointly for A0 and
A1. A similar line of reasoning applies to considerations of
causal null hypotheses related to the effect of A0 on Y1.
These observations are summarized in Table 1 and
formalized in the Appendix. Specifically, the Appendix
covers results for non-binary instruments and treatments
(including continuous treatments, as are common for
Mendelian randomization studies), provides proofs that
also apply to non-causal instruments [1, 2], and extends the
above observations to an arbitrary number of treatment and
outcome times.
On evidence regarding the direction
and magnitude of causal effects
Suppose we find evidence against a causal null hypothesis
and accept condition (i) that the proposed instrument is
indeed an instrument. Can we infer the direction and
magnitude of the average causal effect without making the
homogeneity conditions (ii) that lead to point identifica-
tion? (Estimation of average causal effects under homo-
geneity assumptions is discussed at length elsewhere
[1, 11–13].)
If we find that E Y1jZ ¼ 1½  6¼ E Y1jZ ¼ 0½  then, assum-
ing Z is an instrument, we have no information about the
direction or the size of an effect. This observation has been
made for time-fixed treatments [9]; here we extend it to
time-varying treatments as well.
Using only the instrumental conditions (i), we can
compute bounds for the average causal effect. If both the
lower and upper bound were on the same side of the null
(i.e., both positive or both negative) we would identify the
direction of the average causal effect. However, in most
practical settings, the lower and upper bounds straddle the
null and thus do not identify the direction of the effect
[8, 12, 14]. If we additionally assume the monotonic
treatment effect condition, then we tautologically identify
the direction. As we show in the Appendix, this monotonic
treatment effect condition can also provide a bound on the
minimum effect of continuous treatment: for example, we
may infer that E Y
a0¼1;a1¼1
1
h i
 E Ya0¼0;a1¼01
h i
 E Y1jZ ¼½j
1  E Y1jZ ¼ 0½ j; which aligns with the common state-
ment that the intention-to-treat effect estimate in a trial
with non-compliance underestimates the per-protocol
effect size (but only under the conditions described here!).
While the direction of the effect is not identified under
only the instrumental conditions (i), it has been previously
argued in the setting of time-fixed treatments that relatively
large sources of heterogeneity would need to be present in
order for the direction of the proposed instrument’s effect
on the outcome to not align with the direction of the effect
of the exposure [7]. Future work is needed to explore how
heterogeneity in the time-varying treatment setting affects
this conclusion.
Revisiting Mendelian randomization
findings of sustained treatment strategies
To put the above results in context, we revisit two sets of
canonical Mendelian randomization results: studies of the
causal effects of (i) C-reactive protein (CRP) and (ii)
alcohol consumption on risk of cardiovascular disease.
Several Mendelian randomization studies have found
null associations between genetic variants related to CRP
levels (e.g., variants in the CRP gene) and cardiovascular
disease [15–17]. Under the condition (i) that the proposed
instruments in these studies are indeed instruments, these
null associations provide no evidence against any of the
causal null hypotheses summarized here. That is, under
condition (i), a null association between the genetic
Table 1 Conclusions about causal null hypotheses under the assumptions encoded in the causal diagram in Fig. 3
Causal null hypothesis Null association between instrument and outcome Non-null association between instrument and outcome
Sharp causal null
A0 on Y0 No evidence against Evidence against
(A0, A1) on Y1 No evidence against Evidence against
A0 on Y1 No evidence against No evidence against
A1 on Y1 No evidence against No evidence against
Average causal null
A0 on Y0 No evidence against If monotonic treatment effect, evidence against
(A0, A1) on Y1 No evidence against If monotonic treatment effect, evidence against
A0 on Y1 No evidence against No evidence against
A1 on Y1 No evidence against No evidence against
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variants and cardiovascular disease is consistent with CRP
having no effect on cardiovascular disease, but it is also
consistent with a non-null causal effect.
Several Mendelian randomization studies have found
non-null associations between genetic variants related to
alcohol consumption (e.g., variants in the ADH1B or ALDH2
genes) and cardiovascular disease [18–20]. Under condition
(i) that the proposed instruments in these studies are indeed
instruments, these associations provide evidence against the
joint sharp null hypothesis. That is, we would conclude that,
for at least one person in the study population, changing
alcohol consumption levels by some (unspecified) amount at
some (unspecified) point in time would affect cardiovascular
disease risk. Evidence against the sharp null hypothesis may
be a useful step in the scientific process, but this evidence
alone is agnostic to whether specific interventions on alcohol
consumption in a population would have beneficial or
detrimental effects. For example, testing the joint sharp null
hypothesis does not tell us whether reducing alcohol con-
sumption in everybody across the life-course would have a
joint non-null effect (i.e., a component of the joint average
null), or whether changing alcohol consumption at a certain
point in the life-course has an effect in one or more indi-
viduals (i.e., a non-joint sharp null).
If we additionally are willing to assume a monotonic
treatment effect of alcohol consumption on cardiovascular
disease risk (which may not be plausible in this setting), the
observed associations in Mendelian randomization studies
could also provide evidence against the joint average
causal null. Collectively, the publications on alcohol con-
sumption tend to draw further conclusions about the
direction of the causal effect. For example, one meta-
analysis of Mendelian randomization studies [20] states
that ‘‘reduction of alcohol consumption, even for light to
moderate drinkers, is beneficial for cardiovascular health.’’
Such conclusions rest upon further causal assumptions, and
the biologic plausibility of these assumptions (in addition
to the instrumental variable assumptions) needs to be
carefully weighed on a case-by-case basis [11].
Discussion
We have shown that having an instrumental variable is
insufficient to test many versions of causal null hypotheses
for time-varying exposures, and at best provides evi-
dence concerning a specific joint sharp causal null hypoth-
esis that a change in the exposure at any time would have no
effect on the outcome for all individuals. We further
described assumptions that, in conjunction with the instru-
mental variable conditions, allow us to test other sharp and
average causal null hypotheses. Our results have important
implications for the reporting and interpretation of many
Mendelian randomization studies and, more generally, of
any study leveraging the instrumental variable assumptions
to study sustained treatment strategies, including using an
intention-to-treat analysis in a randomized trial to inform our
understanding of per-protocol effects.
Throughout this paper, we have ignored statistical con-
siderations about ‘‘testing of a null hypothesis.’’ Dichot-
omized p values are often used to make decisions about
whether a hypothesis (including the causal null hypothesis)
is true. Such use of p values is incorrect, as many authors
have demonstrated [21–23], and discouraged by the
American Statistical Association [24]. In addition to these
concerns, a proper use and interpretation of statistical tests
requires that the effect of interest is defined. For example,
power calculations have been described for Mendelian
randomization studies previously [25–27] primarily if not
only for time-fixed treatments. However, any discussion of
power for sustained treatment strategies would need to
specify the causal contrasts under study.
Finally, there is a discrepancy between emphasizing the
use of instrumental variables for hypothesis testing only
and epidemiologists’ more typical goal of estimating causal
effects [21–24]. Many epidemiology journals that publish
Mendelian randomization or other instrumental variable
analyses prefer (or insist upon) effect size estimation
regardless of the study design or analysis used. This paper
attempts to clarify what can and cannot be tested with an
instrumental variable, but does not address the larger issue
of whether or how null testing should be conducted.
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